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A New Approach to Monetary Control* 
E. Gerald Corrigan, President 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
October 6, 1979, has become one of those dates which 
is instantly recognized as being associated with some-
thing important—and rightly so. After all, it was the 
day on which Pope John visited Washington, D.C. 
However, as you and I know, the Pope's visit was 
not the only extraordinary event occurring in Washing-
ton on that fall Saturday morning. The Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) had assembled in an 
extraordinary Saturday session. At the conclusion of 
the meeting the Fed announced a series of policy 
changes which included some conventional moves and 
a change in the method used to conduct monetary pol-
icy. Specifically, the Fed indicated its intent to place 
"greater emphasis in day-to-day operations on the 
supply of bank reserves and less emphasis on confining 
short-term fluctuations in the federal funds rate."t 
This change in operating procedures — or, to be 
more precise, the change in emphasis in operating pro-
cedures—was a recognition that, because of sudden 
and unpredictable shifts, the relationship between the 
amount of money demanded and interest rates had 
weakened. Hitting a specified funds rate target, there-
fore, provided increasingly less assurance that the 
corresponding money targets would be hit—even over 
long periods of time. Aside from the technical issue of 
how to best control money, the change in procedures 
was also intended to draw greater public attention to 
the notion that one necessary prerequisite to control-
ling inflation over time rests in achieving disciplined 
and restrained growth in money and credit. 
•Remarks made at the Financial Forum of the Graduate School of Business 
Administration, New York University, November 3, 1980. 
t See Announcements, Federal Reserve Bulletin 65 (October 1979):830. 
Now, more than a year later, it is appropriate that 
we consider our experience with these new operating 
procedures. As someone who reads the financial press 
carefully and spends a fair amount of time talking with 
people in the markets, I am struck with the skepticism 
that still exists as to whether, in fact, anything has 
really changed. By the same token, I am also struck at 
times by the extent to which other observers, both in 
the markets and in academic circles, argue that too 
much has changed. Thus, the focus of my remarks will 
be on my perceptions of the changes that have oc-
curred in our operating techniques. 
Something has changed 
From my vantage point, the fact that something has 
changed is clear. And I think that the evidence of 
change is beyond dispute. I know that from the nature 
of the discussions at the meetings of the FOMC; I 
know that from the language of the Committee's direc-
tives to the Manager of the System Open Market 
Account; I know that from the manner in which infor-
mation is presented to the Committee by the staff and 
by the manner in which the Committee reacts to the 
information at its disposal. 
These inherently immeasurable indications of 
change are reinforced by indications of change in mar-
ket variables. Here, too, the evidence of change is, I 
believe, convincing. The daily movement in the funds 
rate was twice as large after October 1979 as it was 
in a comparable period before then. Likewise, the 
monthly variability of the funds rate was substantially 
larger after October 1979 than before. Of course, this 
change in variability may be due to factors other than 
our new operating procedures. There is, however, less 
l ambiguous evidence of a change in policy. Our Re-
search Department at the Minneapolis Fed developed 
mathematical characterizations of how the FOMC re-
acted to changes in the money supply, interest rates, 
and several other economic variables in two compa-
rable periods before and after October 1979. To put it 
simply, they expressed the Fed's decision rules as for-
mulas. They found that, using standard statistical 
techniques, they could strongly reject the claim that 
there has been no change in the way the Fed reacts to 
developments in the money supply and interest rates. 
They found that the Fed has indeed been following a 
new policy. The result of this new policy is that the 
federal funds rate is more sensitive to changes in the 
growth of money; it responds both more quickly and 
more sharply. 
I do not mean to suggest that interest rates never 
enter into the Committee's deliberations. The Commit-
tee's directives still contain a band on the funds rate, 
a band that is typically 500 to 600 basis points wide. 
By and large, however, the band is viewed by the 
Committee as a reference point for consultations rather 
than a strict constraint on day-to-day operations as it 
was in the past. Also, the limits on the funds rate band 
are looked at in terms of weekly averages rather than 
limits for individual days or points of time within days. 
Here, too, I believe the record confirms the fact that 
the Committee is less concerned with interest rates 
than before. 
I know that some would argue that the mere pres-
ence of a funds rate band—no matter how wide and no 
matter how willing the Committee to alter its limits — 
constitutes prima facie evidence that nothing has 
changed. I also know that some observers continue to 
believe that there is, in some sense, a de facto narrow 
limit on even daily movements in the funds rate. I do 
not accept those views, nor do I accept the view that 
monetary policy should be totally indifferent about 
interest rates. Whatever one claims about the role of 
interest rates in the process of monetary policy formu-
lation, they are and will remain the vehicles around 
which households, businesses, and financial institu-
tions make portfolio adjustments. Those portfolio de-
cisions have implications for economic activity, and 
they may have important implications for the size of 
the reserves multiplier. These considerations insure 
that interest rates will play a role in deliberations about 
monetary policy. However, neither this inevitability 
nor the Committee's practice of establishing large 
ranges for federal funds rate movements is incompat-
ible with the changed policy that the Fed has followed 
since last October. In short, policy has changed, but 
not to the total exclusion of any consideration of in-
terest rates. But, clearly, interest rates rank lower— 
much lower—in the hierarchy of things than they did 
prior to October 6, 1979. 
Good and Bad Results 
The results of the change in policy emphasis are, of 
course, more important than the changes themselves. 
In looking at those results, I would have to concede 
that we have a little bit of the good news-bad news 
syndrome. The good news takes two forms: first, the 
objective of calling increased public attention to the 
need for restrained growth in money and credit over 
time has been eminently successful — at times I am 
tempted to think almost too successful! Second, looked 
at over time, the growth of money has been restrained. 
For example, from the fourth quarter of 1979 to the 
fourth quarter of 1980, MIA and M1B are estimated 
to have grown at annual rates of about 5.5 and 7.5 per-
cent, respectively, while the growth of M2 has been at 
9.7 percent. For 1980 to date, MIA is within its target 
range, and M1B and M2 are currently running some-
what above the targets for the year, following the burst 
of money growth experienced in recent months — a 
surge in money growth that is not all that easy to 
understand. (See the box for an analysis of money 
growth using more recent data.) 
In considering those ranges and actual money 
growth for 1980, I would also note that when those 
ranges were announced last February, they were uni-
versally viewed as rigorous and demanding—indeed, 
to some, virtually unattainable. Thus, at this point, and 
looked at in the perspective of appropriately long time 
frames, I have to conclude that we have had a measure 
of success in keeping the growth of money in line with 
intentions and in line with a pattern of growth that 
should be compatible with a reduction in inflation over 
time. 
The bad news, of course, is that over the period in 
question we have had considerably more variability in 
both money growth and interest rates than we might 
have hoped for. That variability is troubling in part 
because it complicates decision making and financial 
planning and also because it tends to feed upon itself, 
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particularly in markets that are as sensitized as ours 
seem to be. Thus, I think it is important that we seek to 
understand the reasons for this variability and seek to 
find ways to minimize it in the future. 
Correcting a Misspecification 
When an adjustment is made for a technical misspecifi-
cation, monetary growth for 1980 as a whole was in line 
with the Fed's objectives. 
The Federal Reserve's targets for the growth of the 
monetary aggregates over 1980 were developed at the 
outset of the year. In developing the targets at that time, 
an estimate had to be made of the amount of conventional 
demand and savings deposits that would shift into new 
types of interest-earning checking accounts such as ATS 
and NOW accounts. Such shifts — which have little or no 
economic significance — can distort the measured rates of 
growth of the various monetary aggregates. For example, 
because the new types of checkable deposits are not in-
cluded in the definition of Ml A but are included in M1B, 
shifts from conventional checking accounts into them tend 
to artificially depress the growth of MIA and to arti-
ficially increase the growth of M1B. Similar shifts out of 
conventional savings accounts, which are in M2 but not in 
Ml B, into the new types of checking accounts also tend to 
artificially increase the measured growth of M1B. 
The money growth targets for 1980, as specified in 
February 1980, assumed that such shifts would amount to 
a 0.5 percentage point difference between the midpoints 
of the targeted growth ranges for MIA and M1B in 1980. 
It now appears that the differential between the growth of 
MIA and Ml B for the year will be about 2 full percentage 
points because the new types of checkable deposits have 
grown much more rapidly than initially assumed. Thus, 
the 1980 growth targets were technically misspecified. 
Adjusting the targets for this technical misspecification 
requires lowering the targeted growth range for MIA 
about 1 percentage point and increasing the targeted range 
for M1B about 0.5 percentage point. When this adjust-
ment is made, the actual growth rates of Ml A and M1B 
are a bit more than 5 and 7 percent, respectively (mea-
sured on a fourth quarter 1980 over fourth quarter 1979 
basis), each about at the top of the targeted growth range 
for the year. Thus, despite the troubling short-run variabil-
ity in money growth rates during the year, the performance 
of money growth relative to targets for the year as a whole 
was in line with intentions. 
Reasons for Variability 
As I see it, a variety of factors — some real, others 
technical—contributed to the variability we have wit-
nessed. On the real side, I am convinced that the 
sudden imposition and then removal of credit controls 
did produce a significant shift and countershift in the 
demand for money balances which contributed impor-
tantly to the sharp drop and subsequent rebound in the 
growth of money. Similarly, the pattern of growth in 
nominal income also had a major impact on the vari-
ability of both money and interest rates. Indeed, I would 
guess that the amplitude of the swing in the growth of 
nominal income between April and September-Octo-
ber of this year must rank as one of the sharpest such 
swings over such a short interval in our recent eco-
nomic history. Surely, the amplitude of that swing in 
nominal income contributed directly and importantly 
to the fall and subsequent rise in money and interest 
rates. 
To the extent that these judgments are correct, the 
horns of the dilemma facing the Fed become more 
evident. The amplitude of the swing in money could, 
perhaps, have been moderated, but at the expense of a 
still sharper swing in interest rates. As I see it, there is 
no other set of circumstances that could have produced 
less variability in money in those circumstances, but I 
have to ask myself whether it would have been prudent 
to seek to moderate the swing in money by producing 
still larger variations in interest rates, particularly since 
there are lags between changes in Fed actions and 
changes in the growth in money. 
On more technical grounds, there are at least three 
sets of factors which have contributed to the variability 
we have seen. First, there are lags in the adjustment 
process between the growth of reserves and the growth 
in money. When the Fed sets or adjusts a reserve path 
or when market rates rise or fall sharply in response to 
changes in the demand for credit, the adjustments and 
portfolio shifts that ultimately reflect themselves in 
altered growth rates in money take time. The length 
and stability of these lags are open to some debate, but 
their presence is beyond dispute. Thus, if the money 
supply and interest rates drop sharply—say, for a 
quarter—with a given reserve path, the drop itself 
tends to set into play corrective forces in the opposite 
direction. If, in response to the drop in money growth, 
the Fed raises its reserve path, its action might not 
3 have any effect until the correcting move has already 
begun. Then the correcting move in the opposite direc-
tion would be amplified, just the opposite of the in-
tended result. 
The presence of these lags greatly complicates the 
already complex question of what kinds of information 
and developments the Fed should react to, given tar-
gets for the growth in money and some initial path of 
reserves thought to be compatible with that desired 
growth rate in money. Suppose, for example, opera-
tions remain right on path, but for a week, a month, or 
even a quarter, money growth is faster than expected 
or desired. Do you adjust the path, or do you assume 
that the money growth pattern is simply an aberration 
that will work out over time? These decisions are never 
easy, but in an environment in which there are lags, 
they become even more difficult, because if an adjust-
ment in the reserve path is made, that very adjustment 
may produce conditions in the future that will ulti-
mately require offsetting actions in the opposite di-
rection. 
A second technical source of the variability in 
money and interest rates that we have witnessed may 
be traced to lagged reserve accounting. Lagged reserve 
accounting was not a problem in the context of the old 
operating procedures, and, in most weeks, it is not a 
major problem under the new operating procedures. 
However, on those few occasions in which there are 
large and unexpected deviations in deposit growth, the 
presence of lagged reserves can add to our problems. 
For example, absent lagged reserves, the funds market 
might provide a quicker tip-off of a sudden surge in 
money growth, and the resulting transitory run-up in 
the funds rate might help to blunt the surge in money 
growth. At the very least, we would know more sooner. 
Thus, contemporaneous or at least more contempo-
raneous reserve accounting might help. However, even 
here there are sharply differing viewpoints as to just 
how much help would be forthcoming. 
Finally, and still on the technical side, we are be-
deviled by a whole range of definitional and measure-
ment problems. The disparity between the growth of 
MIA and M1B which has emerged during 1980 as a 
result of shifts into automatic transfer service (ATS) 
accounts is a case in point. The still somewhat mys-
terious growth in money by $10 billion in the single 
week of August 6 is another case in point. In this 
regard, I wish I could tell you that these kinds of data 
problems were a thing of the past. Unfortunately, that 
will not be the case— at least for a while. For example, 
the introduction of negotiable order of withdrawal 
(NOW) accounts nationwide beginning in January 
1981 will surely bloat the growth of M1B in a wholly 
artificial way for some time. Similarly, as thousands of 
institutions begin filing reports of deposits with the Fed 
and maintaining reserves with the Fed for the first time 
as required by the Monetary Control Act, there is sure 
to be a period of at least several months in which re-
porting errors and other operating problems will pro-
duce errors and distortions in both reserve and money 
numbers. While both of these particular problems 
should be transitory, they will almost certainly produce 
some confusion and some doubt as to the underlying 
intent and performance of Fed policy. 
The new procedures are better 
Against the backdrop of the good news and the bad 
news, the obvious question that arises is, What is the 
bottom line — are the post-October 6 techniques an 
improvement over the pre-October 6 procedures? My 
answer is yes. I reach that conclusion not simply 
because the evidence of what, in fact, has occurred 
since October 6 is, on balance, compatible with that 
conclusion. I also have to ask myself the question of 
what would have occurred had the change in policy not 
occurred. That question, to be sure, is a hypothetical 
one that is open to considerable debate. However, 
whatever the problems with the new procedures, I at 
least am willing to speculate that the growth of money 
for the period as a whole would not have been as 
restrained as it has been were it not for the change. 
Having said that, I hasten to add that I believe that 
we can improve these techniques and procedures. In 
the near term, definitional and data problems — in part 
associated with the implementation of the Monetary 
Control Act—will further complicate matters. How-
ever, once the crunch associated with that process is 
behind us, universal reserves and reporting of deposits 
should help, as should the major simplification of the 
structure of reserve requirements. Similarly, once that 
initial crunch is behind us, we can take a fresh and 
unencumbered look at lagged reserve requirements. 
More fundamentally, perhaps, we now have more than 
a year of experience with the new procedures which, 
in itself, provides considerable grist for the analytical 
mill. That ongoing analysis of experience with the new 
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procedures will, I am confident, generate ideas for en-
hancement and improvement. 
Whatever enhancements or modifications may grow 
out of that evaluation and out of the continued evo-
lution of events, and even assuming the best in terms of 
transitional problems such as the introduction of NOW 
accounts nationwide, we still, in my mind, have to 
come to better grips with the question of what kinds of 
information we react to and how we react. Even in a 
highly simplified world in which we know exactly what 
"money" is and can measure it precisely from week to 
week, there will be deviations from targets, there will 
be aberrations, there will be external shocks, and there 
will be uncertainty. In this context, it seems to me that 
the wide and growing body of knowledge in the area of 
decision rules and information filtering may be relevant 
to the task of more systematically determining what is 
noise and what is real. 
In summary, there has been a change in the way we 
conduct monetary policy. The change has not been 
without its problems, and certainly the task of mone-
tary control faces some very tough hurdles in the year 
ahead. But those hurdles — the inevitable short-run 
blips in the money supply, the inevitable second guess-
ing as to why the Fed entered the market at 11:07 a.m. 
instead of 11:30 a.m. — should not be misconstrued. 
The technicalities, the debate, and the dialogue aside, 
the underlying objective of the exercise has been and, 
from where I stand, will continue to be achieving rates 
of growth in money that, over time, are compatible 
with a sustained reduction in inflation. 
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